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COMMENT
THE SUPREME COURT'S LIMITING OF FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR DEFENDANTS
IN DEFAMATION CASES
INTRODUCTION
CBS broadcast a ninety-minute documentary on January 23, 1982,
that charged General William C. Westmoreland, the American com-
mander during the Vietnam War, and others with "a conspiracy, at the
highest levels of American military intelligence, to suppress and alter
critical intelligence on the enemy."' The program, entitled "The Un-
counted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," had interviews with several for-
mer military officers and intelligence analysts who said the command in
Vietnam had deliberately understated the number of North Vietnamese
infiltrating into South Vietnam. General Westmoreland felt the program
had defamed him, and on September 13, 1982, he sued CBS for libel,
seeking $120 million in damages.2 The suit was settled out of court just
before it went to the jury.3
Traditionally, people who have been defamed have cherished both
their good name and their right to free speech.4 The Supreme Court has
tried to balance these conflicting interests in libel cases involving the first
amendment's5 protection of freedom of the press. In 1964, the Court held
that the first amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering
1. Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 609 (1983).
2. Id. This action is but one in a growing number of libel suits with huge judgments and
enormous costs. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (jury awarded the president
of Mobil Oil over $2 million for story by the Washington Post stating that he "set up his son" in a
shipping management firm; defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. granted; jury verdict reinstated);
Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1985) ($10 million libel suit by South Dakota
governor reinstated); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l Inc., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1982) (judgment in favor of Miss Wyoming reversed on appeal); Burnett v. National Enquirer,
Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014-(1984).
3. Atler, The General's Retreat, NEWSWEEK, March 4, 1985, at 59.
4. Note, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Libel, United States Supreme Court Reaf-
firms Its Decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. to Emphasize the Individual Injured in a Libel
Action Rather Than the Event Reported, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 351, 351 (1976).
5. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct in
office unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual mal-
ice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."6 The Court extended the actual malice
standard to include public figures three years later in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts7 and Associated Press v. Walker.' In 1971, the Court ex-
tended the use of the actual malice standard to include all matters of
general or public interest in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.9 The Court
began limiting the protections afforded defendants in defamation actions
three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 10
Part I of this comment surveys libel law prior to the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan " decision in 1964. Part II reviews the New York Times
case. Part III examines the extension of the actual malice standard to
public figures. Part IV looks at the actual malice standard. Part V ana-
lyzes the limitations the Supreme Court has placed on defendants in def-
amation actions.
I. HISTORY
A. Defamation at Common Law
The common law tort of defamation has been defined as "the uncon-
sented to and unprivileged intentional communication to a third person
of a false statement about the plaintiff which tends to harm his reputation
in the eyes of the community." 2 The plaintiff's prima facie case consists
of proof that "the defendant intentionally communicated to a third per-
son a statement about the plaintiff which tended to expose the plaintiff of
'public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule,
aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace.' -" Defamation is a strict
liability tort. Therefore, the only intent that is required is that the defend-
ant intended to communicate something to a third person; it does not
matter if the defendant did not intend to defame or harm the plaintiff.'4
Common law defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slan-
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
7. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
8. Id.
9. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. Yasser, Defamation as a Constitutional Tort: With Actual Malice for All, 12 TULSA L.J. 601,
603 (1977). Cf W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 779 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON] ("A defama-
tory communication usually has been defined as one which tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided.").
13. Yasser, supra note 12, at 603 (quoting Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262
N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933)).
14. Id. at 604.
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der. t Generally, libel is written or printed defamation which is subject to
wide distribution while slander is oral defamation which is not subject to
wide distribution. 6 Libel is actionable per se if it is clearly defamatory,
with no need to resort to extrinsic facts to show the defamatory mean-
ing. t Slander is actionable per se only if it says the plaintiff (1) commit-
ted a crime which involves moral turpitude, (2) has venereal or some
equally loathsome disease, (3) is unfit or Js not to be trusted in his profes-
sion, or (4) is not chaste.' 8 A libel is actionable per quod if the defama-
tory statement is innocent on .its face, but takes on a defamatory meaning
when illuminated by proof of extrinsic facts. '9
B. Defenses
Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the defendant may
escape liability by establishing that the communication was either abso-
lutely or conditionally privileged.2° It is a well-settled common law rule
that truth is a defense. It is immaterial that the defendant published the
facts for no good reason or the worst possible motive, or that he did not
even believe they were true at the time of publication.2' However, the
defendant has the burden of proving that the statement was completely
true. Belief as to truth, however honest it may be, is no justification for
defamation. Nor may the defendant avoid liability by proving that the
statement was partially true, or, if the charge is one of persistent miscon-
duct, by showing that it was true in a single instance.22
Privilege is also a complete defense if established by the defendant.23
"Conduct which may otherwise impose liability is excusable in cases
where the defendant is acting in furtherance of some" important social
interest because it is more desirable in some situations to protect the de-
fendant and allow the plaintiff to go unprotected.24 The defendant is to-
15. -PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 11, at 771.
16. Yasser, supra note 12, at 604-05. One court has created a third category for electronically
broadcast defamations called "defamacast." Prosser criticized this categorization, calling it "a barba-
rous new word." Id. at 605 n.19; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 112 at 787 (citing American
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962)).
17. Yasser, supra note 12, at 605. If a libel is "actionable per se," general damage to reputation
is presumed. Id.
18. Id. at 605; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 112, at 788-93. Yasser supports the exist-
ence of a fifth, peculiarly American, category of imputations of communist affiliation. However, he'
cites no authority for this proposition. Yasser, supra note 12, at 605 n.22.
,19. Yasser, supra note 12, at 605; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 112 at 795.
"Actionable per quod" means that there is no presumption of general damage to reputation. The
plaintiff must plead and prove special damages.
20. Yasser, supra note 12, at 606; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, §§ 114-116.
21. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 116.
22. Id.
23. Yasser, supra note 12, at 607.
24. Id.
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tally immune from liability if an absolute privilege exists.25 This privilege
is confined to the few situations where there is an obvious policy in favor
of permitting freedom of expression without regard to the defendant's
motives.26 Statements entitled to absolute immunity are (1) those made
in the course of legislative proceedings, (2) executive communications
made in the discharge of official duties, (3) those made in the course of
judicial proceedings, and (4) those uttered by political candidates who
have been granted equal time under the Federal Communications Act.27
The more common situation involves the claim of a qualified privilege.
There was a general recognition in the common law in defamation ac-
tions of a qualified privilege called "fair comment" upon the conduct of
public officers and public employees. 28 This privilege extended to publi-
cation of matters that were of general concern to the public.29 Such items
which have been held to be matters of a legitimate concern to the public
include "the management of public institutions, the conduct of private
enterprise affecting the general community, and the performance of those
who submit their talents to the public for approval.",
30
Although the existence of this privilege was undisputed, there was dis-
agreement whether the privilege was restricted to statements expressing
only "comment" or opinion, or whether it included misstatements of
fact.3" The majority view, adhered to by approximately three-fourths of
the states, was that the privilege of public discussion was limited to opin-
ion, comment, or criticism, and did not extend to any factual misstate-
ment. 2 The reason generally given in support of the majority view is that
the danger that honorable and worthy men may be driven from politics
and public service by allowing too great latitude in attacks upon their
characters outweighs any benefit that might occasionally accrue to the
public from charges of corruption that are true in fact, but are incapable
of legal proof.
3 3
A substantial minority of jurisdictions supported the view that even false
statements of fact are privileged, if they were made for the public benefit
25. Id. This interest is so important that the court is willing to immunize the defendant from
liability for false statements without regard to purpose, motive, or reasonableness.
26. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 114, at 816; Yasser, supra note 12, at 607.
27. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 114; see also Yasser, supra note 12, at 607 and cases
cited therein.
28. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 819 (4th ed. 1971); see also
Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1949).
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 118, at 819.
30. Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE
L.J. 642, 645 (1966).
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 118, at 819.
32. Id. See also Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875,
896 n. 102 (1949) (citing cases from twenty-six jurisdictions that adhere to this view).
33. Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 541 (6th Cir. 1893).
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with an honest belief in their truth.34 In supporting this view, the Kansas
Supreme Court said "that here at least men of unimpeachable character
from all political parties continually present themselves as candidates in
sufficient numbers to fill the public offices and manage the public institu-
tions."35 Under either the majority or minority position, it was agreed
that the privilege extended only to matters bearing upon the official con-
duct or fitness of an officer or candidate, and not to the purely private life
of the person.36
Prior to 1964, freedom of speech and of the press in defamation cases
were occasionally mentioned as an argument in support of a decision at
common law that the particular conduct of the defendant was privi-
leged.37 However, the Supreme Court had consistently refused to give
first amendment protection to any libelous material.3" Then in 1964, the
Supreme Court determined "for the first time the extent to which the
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to
award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics
of his official conduct."'3 9
II. THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE
The Supreme Court said that it reached its decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan "against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."'  Among those attacks on public officials taking place at
this time were those by the supporters of the civil rights movement in the
South, where they encountered the greatest opposition to the civil rights
movement. "Nowhere, with the possibile exception of Mississippi, has
that opposition been more fierce and tenacious than in Alabama."4
The publication in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was a full-page
advertisement that appeared in the New York Times on March 29, 1960.
The advertisement, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," 4 2 was placed by
supporters of the civil rights movement calling themselves the "Commit-
34. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 118, at 820. The leading case on this point is Coleman v.
MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 728-29, 98 P. 281, 287 (1908).
35. Coleman, 78 Kan. at 734, 98 P. at 289.
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 118, at 822.
37. Id. at 819.
38. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
39. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
40. Id. at 270.
41. Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L.
REV. 315, 317 (1965). For a discussion of the events leading up to the case, see id. at 316-18.
42. The title, "Heed Their Rising Voices," was taken from a New York Times editorial. Kalven,
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tee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the
South"43 and it spoke to mistreatement of civil rights workers by the
Alabama Police. Of the ten paragraphs of text in the advertisement, the
third and a portion of the sixth were the basis for the suit. They read as
follows:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of
Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from the
school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed
the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body pro-
tested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was
padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peace-
ful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home
almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They
have arrested him seven times-for "speeding," "loitering" and similar
"offenses." And now they have charged him with "perjury"-a felony
under which they could imprison him for ten years ....44
Plaintiff L.B. Sullivan, a city commissioner for Montgomery in charge
of the police department, was not mentioned in the advertisement by
name.45 However, he contended that the word "police" in the third para-
graph referred to him as the commissioner who supervised the police
department, so that he was accused of "ringing" the campus with police.
He also alleged that the padlocking of the dining hall in order to starve
the students into submission46 would be imputed to the police, and hence
to him. In the sixth paragraph, he contended the statement, "They have
arrested [Dr. King] seven times," would be read as referring to him since
police ordinarily make arrests. He also contended that the "They" who
did the arresting would be equated with the "They" who committed the
other described acts and with the "Southern violators." Thus, he claimed
that the paragraph would be read as accusing the Montgomery police,
and hence him, of answering Dr. King's protest with "intimidation and
violence," bombing his home, assaulting his person, and charging him
with perjury.47
Although a demonstration had taken place on the steps of the state
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup.
CT. REV. 191, 194.
43. The text of the advertisement concluded with an appeal for money for three purposes: sup-
port for the student movement, "the struggle for the right-to-vote," and the legal defense of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader to the movement, who had recently been indicted for perjury.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 257.
44. Id. at 257-58; see also id. app.
45. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 258.
46. Sullivan did not contend the charge of expelling the students was applicable to him since
that was the responsibility of the State Department of Education. Id. at 258 n.2.
47. Id. at 258.
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capitol, some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs were not
accurate descriptions of the events that occurred in Montgomery.4"
The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements in the advertise-
ment were "libelous per se" and were not privileged, so that the defend-
ants would be liable if the jury found that they had published the
advertisement and that the statements were made "of and concerning"
the plaintiff.49 The jury so found, and awarded Sullivan $500,000,"° the
full amount claimed, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the
decision.5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari52 and reversed the
judgment on the ground that "the rule of law applied by the Alabama
courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards
for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct."53 The Court held that the Consti-
tution guarantees
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.54
In Garrison v. Louisiana,55 decided just eight months after New York
Times, the Supreme Court held that the New York Times rule limits state
power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of
public officials.56 In that case, the Orleans parish district attorney attrib-
uted a large backlog of pending criminal cases to the "inefficiency, lazi-
ness, and excessive vacations" of eight judges of the Criminal District
Court of the Parish.
57
48. (1) The students sang the National Anthem, not "My Country 'Tis of Thee." (2) Nine
students were expelled. However, the expulsion was for demanding service at a lunch counter in the
Montgomery County Courthouse, not for leading the demonstration. (3) Most, but not all, of the
student body protested the expulsion. (4) They protested by boycotting classes on a single day, not
by refusing to register. Virtually all of the students registered for the ensuing semester. (5) The
dining hall was not padlocked, and the only students who may have been banned from eating there
were those without the proper meal ticket. (6) The police did not ring the campus in connection with
the demonstration. However, they were deployed near the campus on three occasions. (7) Dr. King
had only been arrested four times. (8) The allegation that Dr. King had been assaulted was unsub-
stantiated. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 258-59; Kalven, supra note 42, at 199.
49. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 262.
50. Id. at 256.
51. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
52. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 371 U.S. 946 (1963).
53. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264.
54. Id. at 279-80.
55. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id. at 66.
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A. Public Official
The offending publication must specifically refer to the plaintiff. How-
ever, it is not necessary that the plaintiff's name appear in the publica-
tion, so long as it can reasonably be read as referring to the plaintiff,
either by name or by official position. 58 The two paragraphs in the New
York Times advertisement contained no reference to Sullivan, either by
name or position. Although Sullivan argued that the reference to him "is
clear from the ad,"59 a number of the statements he relied on for his
claim did not concern the police.' The Court said the two statements
which did concern the police6" "did not on their face make even an ob-
lique reference to respondent as an individual."6 Therefore, the Court
held that the Constitution will not support "an otherwise impersonal at-
tack on governmental operations [as] a libel of an official responsible for
those operations."63
Although the publication must refer to the plaintiff, it is neither neces-
sary that every recipient of the publication recognize him,64 nor that the
work be one of truth. Fictionalized accounts may provide a basis for a
claim that the statement is "of and concerning" the plaintiff.65 However,
the burden of proof is substantially greater where a work of fiction is at
66issue. One court said that for a defamatory statement made about a
fictional character to be actionable, "the description of the fictional char-
acter must be so closely akin to the real person claiming to be defamed
that a reader of the book, knowing the real person, would have no diffi-
culty linking the two."
6 7
Although the holding of New York Times was limited to public offi-
cials, the Court specifically declined to determine "how far down into the
lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation
would extend.. ., or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would
58. 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS .31 (1969).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 289.
61. Those statements were that "truckloads of police ... ringed the Alabama State College
Campus" and that Dr. King had been "arrested ... seven times." Id. at 257-58, 289.
62. Id. at 289.
63. Id. at 292.
64. Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966) (plaintiff was deprived of
the opportunity to prove to the jury that the alleged libel was of and concerning him); see also
Mullenmeister v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 587 F. Supp. 868, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
65. Feter, 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966) (the plaintiff alleged that the libel appeared in the por-
trayal of the chief character in a novel); see also Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980)
(plaintiff is entitled to present evidence to the jury to determine whether the character in a work of
fiction is "of and concerning" him); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29
(1979) (the fact that the book is labeled as fiction did not bar a claim of libel).
66. Fetler, 364 F.2d at 653 (plaintiff's burden "is not a light one"); see also Geister, 616 F.2d at
639 (quoting Feter).
67. Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 320, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249 (1982).
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or would not be included."68 Since that time, courts have been struggling
to determine who is a "public official" for purposes of the New York
Times rule.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,69 a former recreation area supervisor brought
suit against a newspaper columnist whose article concerned fiscal man-
agement of the area, but did not mention the plaintiff by name. He ar-
gued the article, which asked "What happened to all the money last
year? and every other year?" and which could be read to imply pecula-
tion, referred specifically to him as the "man in charge." However, the
Court said the article could also be read as praise for the present
administration.70
In attempting to help clarify the New York Times rule, the Court said
that the designation of public official "applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to
the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the con-
duct of governmental affairs."''7 The Court went on to stress the need for
an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the per-
son, beyond the general interest in the qualifications and performance of
all employees. "The employee's position must be one which would invite
public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in
controversy."
7 2
However, the protection of public official status is not limited to pres-
ent public officials. Because a person who is defamed is a former public
official does not deprive him of the protection of the New York Times
rule.7 3 This is another issue that the Supreme Court has not addressed
directly. In Rosenblatt, the Court did not address the issue because the
plaintiff's theory was that "his role in the management of the Area was
so prominent and important that the public regarded him as the man
responsible for its operation .... ,74' The Court found that the public was
still interested in the management of the area, and that the article, if it
referred to the plaintiff, referred to the performance of his duty as a
county employee. 75 However, the Court went on to state that there may
be occasions where "a person is so far removed from a former position of
authority that comment on the manner in which he performed his re-
68. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
69. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
70. Id. at 79. The trial in Rosenblatt v. Baer took place before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
was decided. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court for a determination of whether the plaintiff was a public official. Id. at 88.
71. Id. at 85.
72. Id. at 87 n.13.
73. Id. at 87 n.14.
74. Id. at 87.
75. Id. at 87 n.14.
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sponsibilities no longer has the interest necessary to justify the New York
Times rule." 6
Just how "far removed" has yet to be determined. How long ago the
person was a public official is balanced with the type of alleged defama-
tion. In Hart v. Playboy Enterprises,77 the plaintiff, a former federal nar-
cotics officer, was a public official for the purposes of a libel action
against a magazine concerning his misconduct, even though six years had
elapsed between the termination of his employment and the publication
of the article. The plaintiff, relying on Wolston v. Reader's Digest Associa-
tion,7 argued he was no longer a public official. The court distinguished
Wolston on the grounds that (1) the case involved a public figure, not a
public official and (2) the sixteen year period which had elapsed in Wol-
ston was significantly longer than the six years here.79 Almost thirty
years had passed between the plaintiff's employment with the House
Committee on Un-American Activities and the publication of defend-
ant's book in Stripling v. Literary Guild. ° Stripling, who was Secretary
and the Chief Investigator of the Committee, argued that the passage of
time had removed him from public official status. The court, noting that
the public controversy over the activities in which the plaintiff partici-
pated had continued for thirty years and showed no signs of ending, said
that "[a]s long as the public interest in free and robust debate [of those
times] remains strong, the constitutional protections . . . remain
applicable."'8
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,"a the Supreme Court said that although it
had not defined the precise boundaries of when a person falls within the
category of public official, "it cannot be thought to include all public
employees, however."
8 3
In determining if an individual is a public official, the Washington
Supreme Court in Clawson v. Longview Publishing Co.,4 said that one
should look to the nature of the plaintiff's duties and functions and to the
76. Id.
77. 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1811 (D. Kan. 1979).
78. 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (plaintiff was no longer a public figure since there were 16 years be-
tween the events and publication).
79. Hart, 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1813 (Although the court reached the decision on the
basis of the distinctions, it noted that Hart had continued to contest his discharge from employment
by various appeals up until 13 months before the article was published.).
80. 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1958, 1959 (W.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1981)
(affirmed without a published opinion).
81. Id. at 1960.
82. 443 U.S. 111 (1976).
83. Id. at 119 n.8. The district court ruled that Hutchinson, who was involved in research for
the federal government, was a public official. The court of appeals did not decide whether Hutchin-
son was a public official; therefore, the Supreme Court did not reach the public official issue. Instead,
the case was decided on the issue of whether the plaintiff was a public figure.
84. 91 Wash. 2d 408, 589 P.2d 1223 (1979).
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plaintiff's relationship to the public.8" The court enunciated two vari-
ables to determine whether the plaintiff is a public official: "(1) the im-
portance of the position held, and (2) the nexus between that position
and the allegedly defamatory information-specifically, how closely the
defamatory material bears upon fitness for office." 6 In Clawson, the ad-
ministrator of a county motor pool brought a defamation action when
the local newspaper reported that he had towed the automobile belong-
ing to the sheriff's son to the county garage and had repaired it on
county time. The court held the plaintiff was a public official. Although
the position held was near the bottom of those who could be considered
"public official" status in the sense of the "actual malice" standard, the
nexus between the position and the alleged defamation could not have
been closer since the allegations related directly to the plaintiff's job per-
formance. The court held the nexus between the job and the alleged defa-
mation bears heavily upon the "public official" determination.87
B. Official Conduct
The Supreme Court also limited the New York Times rule to defama-
tory statements relating to the official conduct of the public official, 8
although the Court declined to determine the boundaries of official con-
duct.89 Just eight months after the New York Times case, the Court said
that offical conduct included "anything which might touch on an offi-
cial's fitness for office .. "90
In 1971, in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy9 1 , the Court concluded that the
New York Times rule also applied to anything which might touch on a
candidate's fitness for office.
9 2
85. Id. at 416, 589 P.2d at 1227.
•86. Id. at 417, 589 P.2d at 1228.
87. Id. In another case in which this test was applied, the Clerk of the Washington State Senate
was an auxiliary security officer in the senate. He was a "public official" when accused of placing
electronic surveillance equipment on the defendant's telephone in the senate because of the nexus
between his actions and the alleged statement. Martonik v. Durkan, 23 Wash. App. 47, 596 P.2d
1054 (1979).
88. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
89. Id. at 283 n.23.
90. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
91. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
92. Id. at 274. The Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of official conduct since the
Monitor Patriot case, but one state court held that a newspaper was entitled to invoke the actual
malice standard in a libel action by a mayor for an article erroneously stating that the mayor had
been arrested and charged with criminal trespass and cattle rustling when in fact the warrant had
charged him with trespassing on private property and shooting at cattle. The news that the mayor
had violated state law, albeit in the conduct of his private affairs, bore close connection to his fitness
for public office. Savannah News-Press v. Whetsell, 149 Ga. App. 233, 235, 254 S.E.2d 151, 152
(1979).
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III. PUBLIC FIGURES
A. The Extension to Public Figures
Three years after the New York Times decision, the Supreme Court, in
the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts93 and Associated
Press v. Walker,94 extended the actual malice standard to include people
who are "public figures." Thus, people who are "intimately involved in
the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame,
shape events in areas of concern to society at large"95 are entitled to con-
stitutional protection in libel actions.
The Butts case stemmed from an article published in the Saturday Eve-
ning Post which accused the athletic director at the University of Geor-
gia, Wally Butts,96 of conspiring to "fix" a football game between
Georgia and the University of Alabama. The article, entitled "The Story
of a College Football Fix," claimed Butts had given the head coach at
Alabama " 'Georgia's plays, defensive patterns, all the significant secrets
Georgia football team possessed.' "" Butts brought a diversity action in
federal court in Georgia against Curtis Publishing Company, the pub-
lisher of the Saturday Evening Post, seeking $5,000,000 in compensatory
damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. The only defense that Cur-
tis Publishing Company raised was that of substantial truth.98 The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Butts for $60,000 in general damages and
$3,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the entire award
to $460,000. 99 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
decision"°° and the Supreme Court granted certiorari t°1 and affirmed.
The Walker case, the companion case to Butts, arose out of the distri-
bution of a news dispatch giving an eyewitness account of events on the
campus of the University of Mississippi on the night of September 30,
93. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
96. Although Georgia is a state university, Butts was employed by the Georgia Athletic Associ-
ation, a private corporation, rather than the state itself. Id. at 135. The athletic association had been
described as a body carrying on "a business comparable in all essentials to those usually conducted
by private owners." Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. 439, 451 (1937).
97. Butts, 388 U.S. at 136. The article alleged that an insurance salesman, George Burnett, had
accidentially overheard a telephone conversation between Butts and Alabama coach Paul Bryant one
month prior to the game. Burnett said that " 'Butts outlined Georgia's offensive plays... and told...
how Georgia planned to defend .... Butts mentioned both players and plays by name.' " Id. (omis-
sions in original).
98. Id. at 137. The trial in Butts' case was completed before the decision in New York Times
was handed down. However, no constitutional defenses were raised although Curtis' counsel were
aware of the progress of the New York Times case, and although general constitutional defenses had
been raised in a libel action against Curtis instituted by the Alabama coach, who was a state em-
ployee. Id.
99. Id. at 138.
100. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965).
101. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 385 U.S. 811 (1966).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1987], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol16/iss2/4
LIMITING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
1962. 102 The dispatch said that Walker, who admitted he was present on
the campus at the time, had taken command of the violent crowd and
had personally led a charge against the federal marshalls who were
there. 'o3 Walker sued the Associated Press in Texas state court, seeking a
total of $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The Associ-
ated Press raised both the defense of truth and constitutional defenses."m
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Walker for $500,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The trial court refused
to enter the punitive damage award because there was no evidence of
actual malice. 1O5 Both parties appealed, and the Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals affirmed both the award of compensatory damages and the striking
of punitive damages.'0 6 After the Texas Supreme Court denied a writ of
error, 10 7 the Supreme Court granted certiorari'08 and reversed.
Although Justice Harlan announced the result in the Butts and Walker
cases, a majority of the members of the Court agreed with Chief Justice
Warren's concurring opinion that the actual malice standard applies to
"public figures" as well as "public officials."'0 9 The Court reversed the
decision in the Walker case because he "was a public man in whose pub-
lic conduct society and the press had a legitimate and substantial inter-
est," and the trial judge had ruled there was no showing of actual
malice."o However, the court affirmed the decision in the Butts case be-
cause the jury was instructed to determine whether the defendant had
acted with "wanton and reckless indifference.""'
102. On that night, a massive riot errupted as a consequence of federal efforts to enforce a court
decree ordering the enrollment of James Meredith, the first black student at the university. Butts,
388 U.S. at 140; see also Yasser, supra note 12, at 611.
103. Butts, 388 U.S. at 140. Walker, a retired career soldier with the United States Army, who
had been in command of the federal troops during the school segregation confrontation at Little
Rock, Arkansas, was acutely interested in the issue of physical federal intervention. He had made a
number of statements against such action which had received widespread publicity. Id.
104. Although Walker admitted his presence on the campus and conceeded that he had spoken
to a group of students, he claimed he had counseled restraint and peaceful protest, and that he had
exercised no control over the crowd. Id. at 140-41.
105. Id. at 141-42.
106. Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
107. Butts, 388 U.S. at 142.
108. Associated Press v. Walker, 385 U.S. 812 (1966).
109. Butts, 388 U.S. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and
Fortas, comprising the plurality and applying the "highly unreasonable conduct" test voted for re-
covery in Butts, but not in Walker. Chief Justice Warren, applying the actual malice standard also
voted for recovery in Butts, but not in Walker. Justices White and Brennan, also applying the actual
malice standard, thought the standard had not been met in Walker. In Butts, these Justices voted to
remand on the ground of an improper instruction though they, like Warren, thought that actual
malice had been shown. Justices Douglas and Black thought the judgments in both cases were void
because the "First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the harassment of libel
judgments." Id. at 172.
110. Id. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
111. Id. at 156.
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B. Matters of General or Public Interest
In 1971, a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the actual
malice standard be extended to include all matters of general and public
interest. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court in Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc.," said "[i]f a matter is a subject of public or
general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a pri-
vate individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did
not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved."' 13
In the Rosenbloom case, George A. Rosenbloom, a distributor of nu-
dist magazines in the Philadelphia area in 1961, was arrested while mak-
ing a delivery of nudist magazines to a local newstand. Three days later,
the police obtained a search warrant, searched Rosenbloom's home and
warehouse, and seized the books and magazines found there. Rosen-
bloom, who was out on bail when the search and seizure took place,
surrendered to police and was arrested a second time. After the second
arrest, a Metromedia, Inc. radio broadcast reported that obscene materi-
als had been confiscated from Rosenbloom's home.114
Rosenbloom then sued various city and police officials, and several lo-
cal news media, alleging that the magazines were not obscene. He asked
for injunctive relief to prevent the police from further interfering with his
business. Although Rosenbloom was not mentioned by name in a second
series of broadcasts, Metromedia reported that the "girlie-book peddlers"
of the "smut literature racket" were seeking relief. After Rosenbloom
was acquitted of the criminal obscenity charges, he filed a libel suit in
federal district court. He alleged that Metromedia's unqualified charac-
terizations of his books as "obscene" and of him and his business as
"smut distributors" and "girlie-book peddlers," and its characterization
of his suit for injunctive relief as an attempt to force the defendants "to
lay off the smut literature racket" were libelous." 15
At trial, Metromedia relied on the defenses of truth and privilege." 6
After the jury was instructed as to common law libel,' it returned with
a verdict for Rosenbloom for $25,000 in general damages and $725,000
in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the punitive damage award
112. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
113. Id. at 43.
114. Id. at 32-34.
115. Id. at 34-36.
116. Id. at 36.
117. The court charged the jury that four findings were necessary in order to return a verdict for
Rosenbloom: (1) that one or more of the broadcasts were defamatory; (2) that a reasonable listener
would conclude that the defamatroy statement referred to Rosenbloom; (3) that the radio station
had forfeited its privilege to report official proceedings fairly and accurately, either because it in-
tended to injure the plaintiff personally or because it exercised the privilege unreasonably and with-
out reasonable care; and (4) that the reporting was false. Id. at 39.
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to $250,000.118 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that Rosenbloom was required to establish that the alleged
libelous remarks were made. with "actual malice," notwithstanding that
he was not a public figure, but that his evidence did not support the
judgment." 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 120 and affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals.
C. The Retreat
By 1974, hundreds of post-New York Times defamation cases had
worked their way through the courts. 2 ' "The results [sic] of this ava-
lanche of litigation was a continuing struggle to find the appropriate bal-
ance between the rights of free speech and press and the right to be free
from character attacks."' 122 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,123 the
Supreme Court retreated from its position in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,124 which required private figures involved in events of public or gen-
eral interest to show actual malice. In Gertz, a majority of the Court held
that the New York Times standard was inapplicable in a case where the
plaintiff was a private individual.' 25
In 1968, a Chicago policeman, Nuccio, shot and killed a youth named
Nelson. The policeman was subsequently prosecuted and found guilty of
second degree murder. The Nelson family retained Elmer Gertz to repre-
sent them in civil litigation against Nuccio.
12 6
Robert Welch, Inc. published American Opinion, a monthly periodical
expressing the views of the John Birch Society. The magazine had begun
a campaign to warn the public of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit
local law enforcement agencies and create a national police force sup-
porting a communist dictatorship. As part of this effort to alert the pub-
lic, American Opinion commissioned and published an article on the
murder trial of Nuccio. The article, which contained serious factual inac-
curacies, portrayed Gertz as a communist official with a criminal
record.
27
118. Id. at 40.
119. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
120. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 U.S. 904 (1970).
121. Yasser, supra note 12, at 614.
122. Id.
123. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
124. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
125. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
126. Id. at 325.
127. Id. at 326. Gertz attended the coroner's inquest into the boy's death and initiated a civil suit
for damages, but he neither discussed Nuccio with the press nor played any part in the criminal
prosecution. However, the article portrayed him as an architect of the "frame-up."
The article stated that Gertz had been "an official of the 'Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, which [had] advocated the violent
seizure of our government.' "Id. at 326. It labeled him a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter." It
15
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Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the Northern District of Illi-
nois. "8 The defendant filed a pretrial motion for summary judgment,
claiming it was entitled to invoke the privilege of New York Times. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that Gertz might be able to
prove that the article was published with reckless disregard for the
truth.129 After all the evidence was heard, the district court ruled that
Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. Because the court
had ruled that some of the statements constituted libel per se under Illi-
nois law, the court withdrew from the jury's consideration all issues ex-
cept damages. The jury awarded Gertz $50,000. 130
Following the jury's verdict, the district court concluded that the de-
fendant was entitled to the protection of New York Times, and it entered
judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict.1 3 ' The court of
appeals, citing the intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,132 concluded that the statement concerned an issue of significant
public interest and affirmed the district court's decision. 133 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari 34 and reversed the decision.
When the Gertz case reached the Supreme Court, the composition of
the Court which had fractionated so badly in Rosenbloom had changed.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist occupied the seats previously held by Jus-
tices Harlan and Black. The new Justices joined Justices Marshall and
Stewart in adopting the substance of the views which they and Justice
Harlan had offered in Rosenbloom.' 35 Justices Marshall and Stewart also
abandoned their view from Rosenbloom that punitive damages were con-
also said that he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which was described as "a
Communist organization that 'probably did more than any other outfit to plan the Communist at-
tack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention.' " Id.
The article also stated the police file on Gertz "took 'a big, Irish cop to lift.' " Id.
The implication that Gertz had a criminal record was false. Although he had been a member and
officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 years earlier, there was no evidence that he or the
organization had taken any part in the demonstration at the Democratic convention in 1968. There
was no basis for the charge that he was a "Leninist" or a "Communist-fronter." Finally, he had
never been a member of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the "Intercollegiate
Socialist Society." Id.
128. Id. at 327.
129. Id. at 328.
130. Id. at 328-29.
131. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970). The trial court,
anticipating the reasoning of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., concluded that even though Gertz
was not a public official or a public figure, the discussion of a public issue was protected without
regard to the status of the person defamed. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 329-30.
132. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
133. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
134. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 410 U.S. 925 (1973).
135. One commentator theorized that Justices Powell and Rehnquist voted the way they did
because of their apparent sensitivity to the fact that the Rosenbloom plurality had nearly destroyed
the common law of defamation. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1409 (1975).
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stitutionally proscribed. These four were joined by Justice Blackmun,
who switched his vote.'36 This produced a clear majority for the first
time in these type decisions since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'37
In the opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court reaffirmed the posi-
tions taken in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 38 rejected the extension proffered in the plurality decision in
Rosenbloom, enunciated some guidelines for defining a "public figure,"
and delineated the limits when liability and damages may be imposed in
defamation cases.
In affirming the use of the actual malice standard for public persons,
whom the Court categorized as public figures 39 and public officials," 4
the Court held that the standard was an accommodation between the
interests of the press and broadcast media in immunity from liability and
"the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions brought
by public persons." '' The state has a greater interest in compensating
injury to the reputation of private people because those individuals
known as public persons "usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic op-
portunity to counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy. '  However, a private individual who is defamed "has
relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good
name," 14 3 but is "more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in pro-
tecting [him] is correspondingly greater." 1" Therefore, a private individ-
ual is in greater need of the courts to redress the injuries inflicted by
defamatory statements.
As to matters of public or general concern, the Court was of the opin-
ion that the extension of Rosenbloom would abridge the state interest in
enforcing a legal remedy for defamatory falsehoods which injure a pri-
vate individual. The Court also thought the extension of the privilege to
136. Id. Justice Blackmun had concurred in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. In his concur-
ring opinion in Gertz, he said he joined the Rosenbloom plurality bacause he felt it was the "logical
and inevitable" extension of New York Times and its progeny. He confessed he sensed "some illogic"
in the rejection of the Rosenbloom standard, and would adhere to his prior view, were his vote not
needed for a majority. However, he joined the majority because the opinion removed "the specters of
presumed and punitive damages" in the absence of New York Times malice and it was important for
the Court "to come to rest in the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position."
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 353-54 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
139. The Court defined public figures as "[tihose who, by reason of the notoriety of their
achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention." Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 342.
140. Public officials were defined as "those who hold governmental office." Id.
141. Id. at 343.
142. Id. at 344.
143. Id. at 345.
144. Id. at 344.
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matters of public or general concern "would occasion the additional diffi-
culty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis
which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and
which do not-to determine. . . 'what information is relevant to self-
government.' """
After rejecting the Rosenbloom standard, the Court addressed the issue
of whether Gertz was a public figure. In seeking to further define who is a
public figure, the Court held that public figure status may rest on either
of two alternatives:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or no-
toriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all con-
texts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume
special prominence in the resolution of public questions. 146
In determining whether a person is a public figure, the Court held that
"[i]t is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaning-
ful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's partici-
pation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation."
1 47
Although Gertz had a long history of involvement in community and
professional affairs, having served as an officer of local civic groups and
professional organizations, he had achieved no general fame or notoriety
in the community. Therefore, he was not an all-purpose public figure.
Also, although Gertz was at the coroner's inquest, his participation re-
lated solely to his representation of a private client in a civil action. Gertz
took no part in the criminal prosecution of Nuccio, and he never dis-
cussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never
quoted as having done so. Therefore, Gertz did not thrust himself into
the vortex of the Nuccio trial so he was not even a public figure on the
limited issue of Nuccio's trial. Thus, the Court concluded that Gertz was
a private person and the New York Times standard was inapplicable.
In addition to finding that Gertz was not a public figure and remand-
ing the case, the Court enunciated important guidelines for the determi-
nation of liability and damages. In the case of a private figure, the
individual states were allowed to continue to define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability so long as they do not impose liability
without fault.' 48 The Court also imposed a significant restriction on re-
covery of damages by a private individual. In extending the New York
145. Id. at 346.
146. Id. at 351.
147. Id. at 352.
148. Id. at 347, 348. This was equitable, because it recognizes the strength of the state's interest
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to their reputation. However, it shields the
press and broadcast media from strict liability. Id.
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Times rule to punitive damages, the Court stated "States may not permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not
based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth." 1
49
D. The Public Figure Standard
Courts have had difficulty drawing the line between public figures and
private individuals. One district court judge said the nebulous concept of
defining a public figure "is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the
wall."' ° When that case reached the court of appeals, the Fifth Circuit
commented that the public figure concept "has eluded a truly working
definition" and "falls within that class of legal abstractions where 'I
know it when I see it' in Justice Stewart's words."' 1
When it set forth the standard of the all purpose public figure, the
Supreme Court cautioned the lower courts to use care in determining
who is a pervasive public figure:
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community
and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes. Ab-
sent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and
pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not
be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life."5 2
However, courts have found a wide variety of people and organizations
to be pervasive public figures. Individuals who are pervasive public
figures include television personalities and entertainment figures, 153 pro-
fessional athletes, 154 a well-known political author and journalist, '5 an
149. Id. at 349. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 105 S. Ct. 2939
(1985). In Greenmoss, the Court distinguished the Gertz case by holding that the New York Times
rule applied only to matters of public concern. See also notes 254-75 infra and accompanying text.
150. Rosanova v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443, (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1978).
151. Rosanova v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnote, quoting the
jellyfish analogy, omitted) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J:
concurring)).
152. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
153. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (well-known television personal-
ity); Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984); Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120
Cal. Rptr. 186, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) (author of book on how to give parties who had
appeared on a number of television and radio shows to promote her book); Cochran v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978) ("Playmate" who had appeared in
Playboy magazine).
154. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (former profes-
sional football player); Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine & Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968) (professional baseball player); Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp.
1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (former professional boxing champion); Rood v. Finney, 418 So. 2d I (La.
App. 1982), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 979 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983) (a professional
golfer).
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infamous assasin, 156 a consumer advocate and lawyer,'57 and a noted
civil rights leader.' 58 Organizations who are public figures include
churches' 59 and corporations. 6°
The second category of public figures as defined by Gertz are those
individuals who are public figures for a limited range of issues. This cate-
gory is divided into two subparts: (1) people who are involuntarily drawn
into a particular public controversy 16 ' and (2) people who voluntarily
thrust themselves into a particular public controversy in order to assume
special prominence in the resolution of public questions. 162 Less than two
years after Gertz, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of who is a
public figure in Time, Inc. v. Firestone.
63
In 1964, Mary Alice Firestone and Russell Firestone, the heir to the
tire fortune, sought the dissolution of their marriage in Florida. 6 4 The
proceedings drew a great deal of press in the Palm Beach and Miami
area, and became " 'a veritable cause celebre in social circles across the
country.' "165 After judgment in the divorce was entered, Time magazine
printed an article in its "Milestones" section which stated that Russell
Firestone had been granted a divorce " 'on grounds of extreme cruelty
and adultry.' " The article characterized the trial as having " 'enough
testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides. . .to make Dr.
155. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977) (also the
author of a syndicated newspaper column and a weekly television show).
156. Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir.
1978) (confessed murderer of civil rights leader).
157. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980) (critic of
the safety of the Corvair automobile manufactured by General Motors).
158. Williams v. Trust Co. of Ga., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976) (had received
widespead publicity for civil rights and labor activities, several arrests, participation in politics, and
efforts to be elected to public office); see also Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481 (D.
Mass. 1980) (publisher of newspaper with stong public stands on controversies; his paper received
nationwide attention for its coverage of the New Hampshire Presidential Primary in 1972, when he
engaged in a celebrated exchange with one of the candidates); Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulk-
ner, 372 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1979) (a "famed figure throughout Alabama" who had been a prominent
businessman, politician, and community leader for over 40 years); Guthrie v. Annabel, 50 Ill. App.
3d 969, 365 N.E.2d 1367 (1977) (chairman of political party and a candidate for sheriff); Steere v.
Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 602 P.2d 1267 (1979) (attorney who practiced law in community for 32 years,
eight as the county attorney, and was a prominent participant in numerous social activities).
159. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (large world-
wide religious movement with five million adherents); Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity v. Sequoia Elsevier Publishing Co., 75 A.D.2d 523, 426 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980).
160. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (large corporation with a
billion dollars in assets; thrust itself into the public arena by offering to sell its stock to the public).
161. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
162. Id. at 351.
163. 424 U.S. 448 (1975).
164. Id. at 450.
165. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751
(Fla. 1972)).
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Freud's hair curl.' "166
Within a few weeks of publication, Mary Alice Firestone demanded a
retraction from Time. When they declined, she filed a libel action in Flor-
ida Circuit Court. Based on a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court en-
tered a judgment against Time, Inc. for $100,000.167 This decision was
reviewed and reversed by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 68 but
was ultimately affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court.1 69 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, 70 and remanded the cause for further findings.
When the Court in Gertz classified limited purpose public figures, it
stated "[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a pub-
lic figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of
truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."' 71 The Court
in Firestone appeared to narrow the classes of public figures to two
classes: (1) all purpose public figures, and (2) those who inject themselves
into a public controversy. The standard for all purpose public figures
remained the same as enunciated in Gertz. However, the standard for
limited purpose public figures was reduced in its dimensions.' 72 Justice
Rehnquist chose the standard from Gertz which described vortex public
figures as those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particu-
lar public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved."' 73 By failing to select the language in Gertz which describes a
public figure as one who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy," '74 the Court limited the class of public
figures to those who thrust themselves into a controversy, and eliminated
the class of involuntary public figures.
The Court in Firestone concluded that the plaintiff was not an all pur-
pose public figure because she "did not assume any role of especial prom-
inence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach
society."'175 The Court, in a footnote, stated that the plaintiff, who was
far from shunnir-.nublicity by holding several press conferences during
the course of the proceedings,176 did not become a public figure "in an
attempt to satisfy inquiring reporters.' ' 177 Nor did the Court find her to
166. Id. at 452 (quoting the item from "Milestones" in Time).
167. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 452.
168. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 279 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
169. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).
170. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
171. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
172. Comment, Developing Standards of Care After Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Experimentation is
Needed, 29 MERCER L. REV. 841, 849 (1978).
173. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 453 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
174. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
175. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 453.
176. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 454 n.3.
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have "thrust herself to the forefront of some unrelated controversy.' '1 78
As to this issue, the majority felt that she did not choose to publicize her




The Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 8 ' in effect,
constitutionalized the minority view that the common law privilege of
fair comment protects false assertions of fact if they are made for the
public benefit with an honest belief in their truth.' 8 ' The Court held that
there was a constitutional rule which "prohibits a public official' 82 from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual mal-
ice.' "'83 This has been described as "unquestionably the greatest victory
won by the defendants in the modem history of the law of torts."'
' 84
The Court defined actual malice as publishing a defamatory statement
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."' 85 Although the definition of the term appears to be
clear from reading the opinion, the Court has spent years reiterating that
it did not mean common law malice. Common law malice, which is fre-
quently expressed in terms of ill-will, spite, or a deliberate intention to
harm the plaintiff, focuses mainly on the defendant's attitude toward the
plaintiff's privacy, not toward the truth or falsity of the material pub-
lished.' 86 The common law standard of malice, which is generally re-
quired to support an award of punitive damages in the typical tort action,
is quite different from the standard of New York Times, and is constitu-
tionally insufficient to establish "actual malice."' 87
Actual malice is a term of art that was "created to provide a conve-
178. Id. at 454-55 n.3.
179. Id. at 454; see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The dissolution of a mar-
riage is not the type of "public controversy" referred to by the Court in Gertz, even though some
members of society will be interested in reading about the marital difficulties of the extremely
wealthy. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.
180. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
181. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
182. This was extended to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
183. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; see supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
184. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 118 at 819. Alexander Meiklejohn, a long time advocate of
the view that "the first amendment is an absolute," Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Abso-
lute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, proclaimed that the New York Times decision was "an occasion for
dancing in the streets." Kalven, supra note 42, at 221 n.125.
185. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
186. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974).
187. Id. For a discussion of the difference, also see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp.
1341, 1349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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nient shorthand expression for the standard of liability that must be es-
tablished before a State may constitutionally permit public officials to
recover for libel in actions brought against publishers." ' 8 The problem
reached the point that one Justice later wrote:
I have come greatly to regret the use in [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan]
of the phrase "actual malice." . . . In common understanding, malice
means ill will or hostility, and the most relevant question in determining
whether a person's action was motivated by actual malice is to ask
"why." As part of the constitutional standard enunciated in the New
York Times case, however, "actual malice" has nothing to do with hostil-
ity or ill will, and the question "why" is totally irrelevant.' 89
The Court still uses the term "actual malice," and has made an effort
since the New York Times case to set forth what it means. However, it
has also recognized that it "cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible
definition," and that "its outer limits will be marked out through case-
by-case adjudication."' 90 But, as the Court noted in St. Amant v.
Thompson,' 9' the cases have furnished some guidance in what is meant
by "actual malice." The reckless conduct required by the standard is not
measured by a failure to investigate, without more,'92 nor is it measured
by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published, or would
have investigated before he published.' 93 Rather, "there must be suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,"'' 94 or that he
acted with a "high degree of awareness of their probable falsity" in pub-
lishing the statements.195
Because direct evidence of "actual malice" is rare, the plaintiff must
focus on both direct and circumstantial evidence. Therefore, factors of
conduct and state of mind, which would not be sufficient standing alone
to prove actual malice, are probative of actual malice.' 96 Thus, while
motive, intent, and ill will are not sufficient to support a finding of actual
malice, they may be factors which indicate actual malice. 197 Other fac-
tors to be considered are the inherent improbability of the story, 98 the
188. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 251.
189. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote ommitted).
190. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968).
191. Id. at 731.
192. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.
193. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
194. Id.
195. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
196. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160; Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
197. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189 (Ist Cir. 1982), aff'd,
466 U.S. 485 (1984); Goldwater, 414 F.2d at 342; Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d
674, 688 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
198. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
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defendant's negligence, 99 his lack of credibility, 2°° his awareness of the
seriousness of the harm to be caused,20 1 his reliance on obviously unrelia-
ble or unverified sources,2°2 the fabrication of the story by the defend-
ant,2°3 and post-publication acts, such as the failure to retract.2 4
Courts have also looked at the type of news being conveyed if the de-
fendant is a news organization. The fact that the defendant had em-
barked on a "program of 'sophisticated muckraking,' designed to
'provoke people, make them mad' "205 in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2°6
was some evidence probative of actual malice. The absence of a "hot
news" deadline, allowing ample time for development of truth and reso-
lution of doubtful material is also probative of the defendant's actual
malice.207 Finally, the Supreme Court has held that inquiring into the
defendant's editorial process is not barred by the Constitution.208
V. PROTECTIONS NARROWED
During its October 1978 term, the Court again narrowed the class of
individuals to which the actual malice standard applies in two cases:
Hutchinson v. Proxmire2° and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association.210
That same term, in Herbert v. Lando,2"' the Court insured that plaintiffs
who are classified as public figures will have a broad range of discovery
tools to aid them in meeting their burden of proof. Finally, the Court
limited the rule of Gertz which requires a showing of actual malice for
the recovery of presumed or punitive damages to only those issues which
involve matters of public concern.22
199. Bose Corp., 692 F.2d at 196; Goldwater, 414 F.2d at 342; Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387,
405 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
200. Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1975); McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513
F. Supp. 1383, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
201. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir. 1976); Mahnke v. Northwest Publi-
cations, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 339-41, 160 N.W.2d 1, 8-10 (1968).
202. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732; Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1361-
62 (Colo. 1983) (source was bitter and frustrated); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 270 S.C. 65, 71,
240 S.E.2d 812, 815, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978) (author recognized his principal source's
"obvious bias").
203. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732; Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 212-13 (7th Cir.
1976).
204. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Dell Publishing Co., 362 F: Supp. 767, 770 (N.D. Cal.
1973).
205. Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 169 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
206. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
207. Id. at 157-58 (Butts article was not "hot news," while the dispatch concerning Walker
required immediate dissemination); see also Carson, 529 F.2d at 211; Burns, 659 P.2d at 1362;
Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 465, 273 A.2d 899, 916 (1971).
208. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169; see infra notes 236-52 and accompanying text.
209. 443 U.S. 112 (1979).
210. 443 U.S. 158 (1979).
211. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
212. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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A. The 1979 Decisions Limiting the Public Figure Concept
The Hutchinson21 3 case involved Senator William Proxmire of Wis-
consin and his "Golden Fleece of the Month" award. The award was
designed to publicize what Proxmire perceived to be the most egregious
examples of wasteful governmental spending. In April 1975, his second
award went to the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration, and the Office of Naval Research, for
spending almost half a million dollars during the preceeding seven years
to fund a project of the plaintiff, Ronald Hutchinson, a behavorial re-
search scientist.214 The bulk of Hutchinson's research was devoted to the
study of emotional behavior, with a particular concentration upon the
behavior patterns of certain animals, such as the "clenching of jaws when
they were exposed to various aggravating stressful stimuli." '215
Senator Proxmire,2" 6 who described Hutchinson's research as "non-
sense" and "transparent worthlessness," claimed that Hutchinson had
"made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey
out of the American taxpayer." '217 In May, 1975, Proxmire repeated the
essence of his speech in a press release sent to about 100,000 people.21
Subsequently, Hutchinson brought a diversity suit in federal court
against Proxmire.2" 9 The district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment,22 ° and the decision was affirmed on appeal.
22 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 222 and reversed.
In reversing, the Supreme Court held inter alia2 23 that Hutchinson
213. 443 U.S. ll (1979).
214. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 114.
215. Id. at 115.
216. Proxmire is not certain whether he delivered the speech on the Senate floor, or merely had
it inserted into the Congressional Record. Id. at 116 n.3.
217. Id. at 116. In his speech describing the federal grants for Hutchinson's research project,
Proxmire concluded with the following comment:
"The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to scream and kick or even
clench my jaw. It seems to me it is outrageous.
"Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as his monkeys grind their
teeth. In fact, the good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a
monkey out of the American taxpayer.
"It is time for the Federal Government to get out of this 'monkey business.' In view of the
transparent worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-
drinking monkeys, it is time we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats who fund
him have been taking of the taxpayer."
Id. (quoting 121 CONG. REC. 10803 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1975)) (statement of Senator Proxmire).
218. Id. at 117.
219. Id. at 118.
220. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
221. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
222. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 439 U.S. 1066 (1979).
223. Although it is beyond the scope of this comment, the principal defense raised by Proxmire
was that his statements were protected by the speech and debate clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. The
Court held that Proxmire was not protected by that clause. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 123-33.
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was not a public figure, even for the limited purpose of receiving federal
funds for research because Hutchinson's published writings, which reach
a relatively small category of professionals in his field, became a matter
of public controversy only because of the Golden Fleece Award. To hold
otherwise would be tantamount to allowing the defendant to "create
their own defense by making the claimant a public figure." '2 24 The Court
said that Hutchinson had neither thrust himself nor his views into the
public controversy to influence others, nor had he assumed any role of
public prominence in the broad question of the concern about public ex-
penditures. The Court also noted that Hutchinson "did not have the reg-
ular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments
of having become a public figure." '2 25
In Wolston,2 2 6 the defendants had published a book entitled KGB: The
Secret Work of Soviet Agents in 1974, which falsely identified plaintiff
Ilya Wolston as a Soviet agent. Although he was never indicted for espio-
nage, he pleaded guilty to a contempt charge in 1958 for failing to appear
to testify before a grand jury investigating Soviet intelligence agents in
the United States. During the six week period between his failure to ap-
pear before the grand jury and his sentencing, fifteen articles appeared in
Washington and New York newspapers which discussed these events.
Following his sentencing, the publicity subsided, and he largely suc-
ceeded in returning to a private life.2 27
Following the publication of the book, Wolston filed a libel suit in fed-
eral court, claiming the passages that stated he had been indicted for
espionage and had been a Soviet agent were false and defamatory. The
trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
ground that Wolston was a limited purpose public figure, who could not
prove actual malice,228 and the decision was affirmed on appeal.229 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari230 and reversed.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that plaintiff was not a public figure
for all purposes because "[h]e achieved no general fame or notoriety and
assumed no role of special prominence in the affairs of society as a result
of his contempt citation or because of his involvement in the investiga-
224. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135.
225. Id. at 136. The suggestion that public figures have a "regular and continuing" access to the
media appears to have been expressed for the first time in Hutchinson. Prior decisions had only
assumed that public figures have greater access to the media than do private individuals. Comment,
Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited, 54 TULANE L. REV. 1053, 1072 n. 128 (1980).
226. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
227. Id. at 159-63.
228. Wolston v. Reader's Digest A~s'n, 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 427
(D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
229. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157
(1979).
230. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 439 U.S. 1066 (1979).
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tion of Soviet espionage in 1958. ''23I However, the Court went on to hold
that the plaintiff was not a limited purpose public figure because the facts
did not warrant a finding that he had " 'voluntarily thrust' or 'injected'
himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding the in-
vestigation of Soviet espionage in the United States." '232 The Court reaf-
firmed its rejection of Rosenbloom, by pointing out that "[a] private
individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by
becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public at-
tention." '233 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that a person who
engages in criminal activity automatically becomes a public figure on the
limited range of issues related to his conviction. The Court viewed Wol-
ston much like it had viewed Mrs. Firestone, insofar as neither plaintiff
had been a willing participant in litigation, and held that a person does
not forfeit any protection which the law of defamation provides merely
by being drawn into the courtroom.2 34
These two decisions confirm that there is no longer a category of invol-
untarily public figures-no longer can a private individual be trans-
formed into a public figure merely because he unwittingly attracts media
attention, or is forced to participate in public events.23' The Court ap-
pears to have narrowed the limited purpose public figure to one who "lit-
erally or figuratively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular
view."
236
B. Herbert v. Lando
237
In 1971, Colonel Anthony Herbert received widespread media atten-
tion when he formally charged his superior officers with covering up war
crimes in Vietnam. 23 ' Herbert alleged that his superiors were not inter-
ested in investigating the charges. He claimed that when he persisted in
231. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 165.
232. Id. at 166.
233. Id. at 167. "A libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to justify applica-
tion of the demanding burden of New York Times." Id. at 167-68.
234. Id. at 168-69.
235. Comment, supra note 224, at 1074.
236. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
237. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
238. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d. Cir 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
Herbert's story fascinated an American public that was increasingly becoming disenchanted
with the Vietnam War. In July 1971, he was interviewed by Life Magazine; that September,
James Wooten of the New York Times wrote an article favorable to Herbert titled "How a
Supersoldier Was Fired From His Command." Interviews with the television personality Dick
Cavett followed which, according to Cavett, elicited a level of view response unmatched by any
other single program. In October 1971, Congress became embroiled in the "Herbert affair"
when Rep. F. Edward Heber, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, convinced the
Army to remove Herbert's poor efficiency report from his military record.
Id. at 981.
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pressing his charges, he was abruptly relieved of his command.239 On
February 4, 1973, CBS culminated the media attention given Herbert
with a segment on its news documentary program, "60 Minutes," which
"cast serious doubt upon Herbert's veracity and concluded that the
American press had been deluded by Herbert's story." 2" Mike Wallace
narrated the program, and Barry Lando produced and edited it.24'
Lando subsequently published an article in Atlantic Monthly based on
the information he had gathered for the show.2 42
Herbert then sued Lando, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for def-
amation, alleging the article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as a
liar.243 Herbert conceded he was a public figure, and then engaged in
extensive pre-trial discovery, including deposing Lando, in order to ob-
tain the evidence he hoped would prove actual malice. 2"4
Lando objected to certain questions relating to his beliefs, opinions,
intent, and conclusions while working on the story on the ground that
any response would be inconsistent with protection afforded the editorial
process by the first amendment. 24' The district court denied his objec-
tion,246 but the court of appeals vindicated the contentions of Lando and
his fellow reporters,247 holding that requiring answers to such questions
239. Herbert's sudden fall from grace suprised many observers. His long career in the military
had been exemplary, under strong leadership, the second battalion had exhibited extraordinary
prowess in battle. His millitary acumen had earned Herbert one Silver and three Bronze stars,
and he had recently been recommended to receive the Distinguished Service Cross.
Id. at 980-81.
"During this period of intense public interest, Herbert announced his retirement from the service."
Id. at 981.
240. Id. at 982. The segment was entitled "The Selling of Colonel Herbert." Id.
241. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 156.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 156-57. "Lando's deposition alone continued intermittently for over a year and filled
26 volumes containing nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits." Id. at 176 n.25.
245. Herbert, 568 F.2d at 982-83. The court of appeals grouped the objectionable questions into
five categories.
i. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or leads to be
pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the "60 Minutes" segment and the Atlan-
tic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind with respect
to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did not reach a conclusion concern-
ing the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from
the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain material.
Id. at 983.
246. The plaintiff sought an order to compel discovery. The district court ruled that because the
defendant's thought processes were important to the issue of actual malice, the plaintiff was entitled
to discovery. Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd,
441 U.S. 153 (1979).
247. Amici curie briefs were filed with the court of appeals on behalf of the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Chicago Sun-Times, The Miami Herald Publishing Co., National Broadcasting
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on Lando's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions would chill the thought
process of journalists and "consume the very values which the [New York
Times] landmark decision sought to safeguard."24 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari,24 9 and reversed the decision of the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court refused
to hold for the first time that when a member of the press is alleged to
have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plain-
tiff's reputation, the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial
processes of those responsible for the publication, even though the in-
quiry would produce evidence material to the proof of a critical element
of his cause of action.
250
The Court felt the expanded protection urged by Lando would place
too great a burden on public libel plaintiffs, a burden already heavy
under New York Times.2" I Thus the Court ruled that in order to meet the
burden of proof, a public libel plaintiff may inquire into the thoughts,
opinions, and conclusions of the defendants responsible for publishing
the defamatory material "where there is a specific claim of injury arising
from a publication that is alleged to have been knowingly or recklessly
false."'252 However, the Court did limit this right of inquiry- there is
constitutional protection from inquiry which "subjects the editorial pro-
cess to private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to
serve some general end such as the public interest. 253
C. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.254
The Supreme Court recently decided to continue to limit the constitu-
tional protections previously afforded defendants in libel suits. In that
case, defendant Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., a credit reporting agency, sent a
report, which was false and grossly misrepresented the assets and liabili-
ties of plaintiff Greenmoss Builders, Inc., to five subscribers to its service
indicating the plaintiff had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. The
plaintiff's president learned of the defamatory report while discussing fu-
ture financing with a bank.255 He immediately called the defendant's re-
Company, Inc., The New York Times Co., and the Radio Television News Directors Ass'n. Herbert,
568 F.2d at 975.
248. Id. at 984.
249. Herbert v. Lando, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
250. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 155.
251. Id. at 170. "Libel plaintiffs are required to prove knowing or reckless falsehood with 'con-
vincing clarity.'" Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964)).
252. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 174. For a detailed discussion of the case, see Note, Self-Censorship
After Herbert v. Lando: The Need for Special Pre-Trial Procedures in Defamation Action, 58 N.C.L.
REV. 1025 (1980).
253. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 174 (footnote omitted).
254. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
255. Id. at 2941. Plaintiff's president testified at trial that he was both shocked and confused
over the report, because at the time of the report, the plaintiff's business was steadily expanding.
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gional office to explain the error and ask for a correction. He also
requested the names of the firms who had received the notice in order to
assure them that their company was solvent, but the defendant refused to
divulge the names of the recipients of the report.256
About a week after the initial report had been sent, when the defend-
ant had determined that the report was false, it sent a correction no-
tice.257 The plaintiff told the defendant that it was dissatisfied with the
notice, and again asked for the list of subscribers who had seen the initial
report. The defendant once again refused to divulge the names.2  There-
after, the plaintiff refused to provide any financial data to the defendant
and requested the defendant to inform anyone seeking such data that
they were being withheld pending the outcome of the plaintiff's defama-
tion action against the defendant.2 59 Instead, the defendant issued a
"blank rating" on the plaintiff, indicating that the plaintiff's circum-
stances were "difficult to classify." This information was given to credi-
tors who requested information on the plaintiff's financial status.2 °
Greenmoss Builders then filed suit in Vermont state court, alleging
that the false report had injured its reputation. It sought both compensa-
tory and punitive damages. The jury returned with a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff and awarded $50,000 in compensatory or presumed damages
and $300,000 in punitive damages. 26' Dun & Bradstreet sought a new
trial, arguing that Gertz precluded a recovery of presumed or punitive
damages unless there was a showing of knowledge of falsety or reckless
disregard for the truth. "The trial court indicated it doubted whether
Gertz applied to 'non-media [cases],' but granted a new trial '[b]ecause...
[it was] dissatisfied with the instructions given to the jury .... 262 The
Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding "that as a matter of federal
constitutional law, the media protections outlined in Gertz are inapplica-
ble to nonmedia defamation actions.,2 63 The Supreme Court granted cer-
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 70-71, 461 A.2d 414, 416 (1983),
rev'd 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
256. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2941.
257. Id. The notice stated that one of the plaintiff's former employees, not the plaintiff, had filed
the bankruptcy petition, and that the plaintiff "continued in business." Id. at 2941-42. At trial, it was
established that the error occured when one of the defendant's employees, a seventeen year old high
school student who reviewed Vermont bankruptcy pleadings, inadvertently attributed a bankruptcy
report filed by one of the plaintiff's former employees. Dun & Bradstreet's representative testified
that it was the routine practice to check the accuracy of the reports with the business themselves, but
no attempt was made in this case to verify the information before reporting it. Id. at 2942.
258. Id. at 2947.
259. Greenmoss Builders, 143 Vt. at 72, 461 A.2d at 416..
260. Id. at 72, 461 A.2d at 416-17.
261. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2942. As a consequence of the defendant's report, the
plaintiff alleged "a damaged business reputation, loss of company profits, and loss of money ex-
pended to correct the error." Greenmoss Builders, 143 Vt. at 69, 461 A.2d at 415.
262. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
263. Greenmoss Builders, 143 Vt. at 75, 461 A.2d at 418.
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tiorari264 and affirmed the judgment of the Vermont Supreme Court, but
for different reasons.
Justice Powell, who also wrote the opinion in Gertz, delivered the plu-
rality opinion. He said that "permitting recovery of presumed and puni-
tive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of 'actual malice' does
not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not
involve matters of public concern." '265
Justice Powell employed the approach used in Gertz and balanced the
strong and legitimate state "interest in compensating private individuals
for injury to [their] reputation" against the first amendment interest in
266 rac ftesaesitrprotecting this type of expression. The importance of the state's inter
est was stressed because, "as Mr. Justice Stewart has reminded us, the
individual's right to the protection of his own good name 'reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being. .... , "267 But while Gertz says that no plaintiff can recover
presumed or punitive damages without a showing of actual malice be-
cause of the first amendment interest, Justice Powell said "[t]he First
Amendment interest [in Dun & Bradstreet] is less important than the one
weighed in Gertz."'261 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell noted
that "speech on 'matters of public concern' is 'at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection,' ,269 while "speech on matters of purely pri-
vate concern is of less First Amendment concern.
27 °
This decision is both a reversal of at least part of the rule in Gertz, and
an abandonment of the reasoning in Gertz.271 In holding that a plaintiff
cannot recover presumed or punitive damages without a showing of ac-
tual malice, the Court in Gertz abandoned the suggestion of Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., which applied the actual malice standard to all
things of general or public interest. The Court in Gertz stated that it did
not want "judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address
issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not." '27 2 However, the
plurality of Dun & Bradstreet returned to the "matter of public concern"
264. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
265. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2948.
266. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-49.
267. Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
268. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2945. Powell noted that the Court has recognized that not
all speech is of equal first amendment importance. See id. at 2945 n.5.
269. Id. at 2945 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S 765, 776 (1978)).
270. Id. at 2946 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983)).
271. One searches Gertz in vain for a single word to support the proposition that limits on
presumed and punitive damages obtained only when speech involved matters of public con-
cern. . . . Distrust of placing in the courts the power to decide what speech was of public
concern was precisely the rationale Gertz offered for rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality
approach.
Id. at 2959 n. II (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
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terminology of Rosenbloom, something a majority in Gertz wanted to
avoid.
As Justice Brennan notes in the dissent, the plurality opinion fails to
explain what is a matter of public concern. The only guidance is that it
" 'must be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and con-
text.' ",273 What the plurality does is "to serve up a smorgasbord of rea-
sons why the speech at issue here is not . . . 'a matter of public
concern.' "274 The reasons include the following: (1) the "speech was
solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience," (2) "the report was made available to only five subscribers,"
(3) the speech was "unlikely to be deterred by state regulation," (4) the
speech was "solely motivated by a desire for profit," and (5) "the report-
ing was also more objectively verifiable than speech deserving of greater
protection. "275
Justice Powell was joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Conner. Jus-
tices Burger and White joined in the judgment, each arguing for the re-
versal of Gertz altogether. Justice Brennan delivered the dissent, joined
by Justice Stevens, and by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, who were
part of the majority in Gertz.
D. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps
2 76
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided the first case helpful to defendants
in defamation actions in over a decade. Although a public figure plaintiff
must show the falsity of the statement at issue in order to prevail in a
defamation action,27 7 the Court had never addressed the issue of where
the burden of proof as to truth or falsity should lie when the plaintiff is a
private figure. In Philadelphia Newspapers, the Court held that a private
figure plaintiff alleging defamation has the burden of proving the falsity
of a media defendant's speech on matters of public concern. In that case,
the Philadelphia Inquirer, a newspaper owned by defendant Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., published a series of articles, written by defendants
William Ecenbarger and William Lambert, between May 1975 and May
1976. The general theme of those articles was that the plaintiffs278 had
links to organized crime and had used those links to influence the state's
273. Dunn & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48
(1983)).
274. Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 2947.
276. 106 . Ct. 1558 (1986).
277. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("a public official [is] allowed the civil
remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false"); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
176 (1979) ("the plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a false publication attended
by some degree of culpability").
278. Plaintiff Michael S. Hepps is the principal stockholder of plaintiff General Programming,
Inc. (GSI), a corporation that franchises a chain of stores selling beer, soft drinks, and snacks. GSI
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governmental processes, both legislative and administrative.279
The plaintiffs then filed suit in Pennsylvania state court, alleging they
had been defamed. As to falsity, Pennsylvania followed the common law
presumption that a person's reputation is a good one and statements de-
faming a person are presumed false, although proof of the truth of the
words by the defendant is an absolute defense to a defamation action. 8 °
Before trial, the parties raised the issue of who has the burden of proof as
to falsity, but the trial court reserved its ruling on the matter. After all
the evidence had been presented, the trial court concluded that the Penn-
sylvania statute281 giving the defendant the burden of proving the truth
of the statements violated the United States Constitution. The trial court
then instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving
falsity. The jury ruled for the defendants. 28 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court viewed the Gertz case as requiring the plaintiff simply to show
fault in actions for defamation. It concluded that a showing of fault did
not require a showing of falsity, held that placing the burden of showing
truth on the defendant did not violate the first amendment, and re-
manded the case for a new trial.283 The Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction 284 and reversed.
The Supreme Court, noting that in Gertz and New York Times a com-
mon law rule had been superseded by a constitutional rule, said "the
common law's rule on falsity-that the defendant must bear the burden
of proving truth-must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement
that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault,
before recovering damages. ' 285 The Court, in a majority opinion deliv-
ered by Justice O'Connor, stated that "[t]o ensure that true speech on
matters of public concern is not deterred,.., the common-law presump-
tion that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks
owns the trademark "Thrifty Beverage." Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1560; Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 309, 485 A.2d 374, 377 (1984).
279. The articles discussed a state legislator ... whose actions displayed "a clear pattern of
interference in state government by [the legislator] on behalf of Hepps and Thrifty." The stories
reported that federal "investigators have found connnections between Thrifty and underworld
figures;" that "the Thrifty Beverage beer chain ... had connections ... with organized crime;"
and that Thrifty had "won a series of competitive advantages through rulings by the State
Liquor Control Board." A grand jury was said to be investigating the "alleged relationship
between the Thrifty chain and known Mafia figures," and "[w]hether the chain received special
treatment from the [state governor's] administration and the Liquor Control Board."
Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1560 (brackets and ellipses in original) (citations omitted).
280. Id.
281. "In an action for defamation, the defendant has the burden of proving, when the issue is
properly raised: the truth of the defamatory communication." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(b)(1)
(1982).
282. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1560-61.
283. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984).
284. 105 S. Ct. 3496 (1985).
285. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1563.
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damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern. ' 286
In- reaching its decision, the Court recognized there will always be
cases where the truth or falsity of the statements cannot be conclusively
resolved.287 If the burden of proving falsity were on the plaintiff, there
would be cases in which the plaintiff could not meet its burden despite
the fact the speech was false. Thus, the plaintiff's suit would fail, even
though it was meritorious. Similarly, if the burden of proving truth were
on the defendant, there would be cases in which the defendant could not
meet its burden despite the fact that the speech was true. Thus, the plain-
tiff's suit would succeed, even though it was not meritorious. The Court
decided the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving falsity because the
Constitution required it to rule in favor of protecting true speech when
the evidence as to truth or falsity is ambiguous 2 s8 and to "protect some
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.
2 9
Although this case is helpful to some defamation defendants, the
Court limited its holding in two respects: (1) to media defendants and (2)
to matters of public concern. The first limitation-to media defendants-
is important for purposes of this comment 29° because the holding does
not apply to nonmedia defendants. 291 Thus, there is a group of potential
defendants who may still bear the burden of proving truth in jurisdic-
tions with laws such as the one in existence in Pennsylvania.292 The im-
286. Id. at 1564. Although Justice Brennan joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, he filed
a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Blackmun, noting he adhered to his view that a distinction
between media and nonmedia defendants cannnot be reconciled with the principle that "[t]he inher-
ent worth of... speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at
1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 2939, 2957 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
287. The Court expressly recognized that placing the burden on the plaintiff would insulate from
liability some speech that is false, but unprovably so. Nonetheless, the Court felt its previous deci-
sions supported this result. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1564-65.
288. Id. at 1564.
289. Id. at 1564-65 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
290. Although the issue is beyond the scope of this comment, limiting the holding to media
defendants may be of greater importance in another context. The first amendment explicitly protects
the freedom "of the press," in addition to protecting the freedom "of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Through most of our country's history, the two phrases have been used interchangeably. Anderson,
The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 456 (1983). In no case has a majority of the
Supreme Court ever recognized the press clause of the first amendment as having independent con-
stitutional significance. It has refused to give the press any more protection than an individual enjoys
under the speech clause. See generally Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (police search
of newsroom); Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (refusal of reporters to disclose confidential
sources). However, Justice Stewart espoused the view that the press clause does have independent
constitutional significance. See Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); see also
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 570-77 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725-52 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
291. The Court said it need not "consider what standard would apply if the plaintiff sues a
nonmedia defendant." Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565 n.4.
292. See, e.g., Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis.2d 636, 654-58, 318 N.W.2d 141, 150-51, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 883 (1982); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978).
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portance of the second limitation to matters of public concern should be
noted because this case is the first one in which a majority of the Court
held that whether the speech at issue is of public concern is a factor in
the outcome of a defamation case.29 3
. CONCLUSION
Although people have always cherished their good name, in 1964 the
Supreme Court felt the first amendment interests, when balanced against
that right to a good name, were more important if the person defamed
was a public official. If a public official is defamed, he is required to prove
actual malice. The Court extended the actual malice standard in 1967 to
public figures, then in 1971, to all matters of general or public concern.
Since 1974, the Supreme Court has been attempting to narrow the pro-
tections offered to defendants in libel actions. That year, the Court in
Gertz rejected the general or public interest approach offered by the Ro-
senbloom plurality. It felt that judges would be making ad hoc determina-
tions as to what was a matter of general or public concern, and they
limited the use of the actual malice standard to public officials and public
figures. The Court did allow states to determine what standard of liabil-
ity would be applied in cases involving private individuals, so long as
strict liability was not used. Two years later, the Court restricted the
public figure doctrine in Time, Inc. v. Firestone by eliminating the class of
involuntary public figures.
In Gertz, the Court also held that states could not allow the recovery
of presumed or punitive damages without a showing of actual malice.
This limitation on presumed or punitive damages appears to be restricted
by Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss, where a plurality said that such dam-
ages could be recovered without a showing of actual damages if the de-
famatory material did not involve a matter of general or public concern.
Since this was only a plurality opinion, with two members concurring in
the judgment only-while arguing that Gertz whould be overruled, we
have returned to the days of Rosenbloom, where there is no clear major-
ity view in the area of punitive damages as they apply to priviate
individuals.
In Hepps, the Court held that private figure plaintiffs must prove fal-
sity before they can recover damages from a media defendant. The Court
expressly limited its holding to media defendants and to matters of public
concern. By holding that the rule of Hepps only applies to matters of
public concern, a majority of the Court used the language of Rosenbloom
which was rejected by Gertz.
293. A force "that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First Amendment
... is whether the speech at issue is of public concern." Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1563.
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Although the law of defamation always has been complex, some com-
mentators thought the constitutional change would make a difficult area
of the law easier to understand. 294 However, the Supreme Curt muddled
this already complex area. The result is that the confusion is worse now
than ever before.
GREGORY L. HUGHES
294. See Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 889 (1984).
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